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rule. The court also seemed well aware of the problems which it
could be inviting through abandonment of the "place of wrong"
rule. But the court stated that the fact that a new rule tended to
increase litigation, or made the law more difficult to apply or
more unpredictable, was not in itself sufficient reason to retain a
rule which is unsound, unjust or inadequate.
Whatever may be the difficulties that lie ahead, a trend away
from the "place of wrong" rule has been established. This does not
necessarily mean that all American courts are quickly going to
discard the old rule for the sake of something new. The law is
slow to change even where there is urgent need for reform. There
is not unanimity of opinion in the profession that a change is
necessary, or even desirable. Sparks, Babcock v. Johnson-a Practicing Attorney's Reflection upon the Opinion and Its Implications,
31 INs. CouNsE. j. 428 (1964). It may very well be that experience
will force some of the more venturesome courts to return to the
sanctuary of the old rule. Certainly there are formidable problems
ahead for those courts which choose this new approach to the choice
of law. Some very anomalous results are sure to follow. It is a safe
speculation that there will be much trial and error before a workable body of law evolves. Regardless of the outcome, the next few
years are certain to be decisive ones in this field of conflict of laws.
CharlesEdward Barnett

Constitutional Law-The Scope of the Escobedo Rule
D was taken to police headquarters where he was interrogated
by officers who suspected he was in possession of obscene film.
Approximately five hours after D's original detention and at a time
when he had not yet been advised that he was under arrest, D
confessed. During this period D did not request counsel. The confession was subsequently used against D and he was found guilty of
knowingly possessing obscene motion picture films for purpose of
loan. Held, reversed and remanded. The chief judge, with whom
one other judge agreed, held in his majority opinion that when a
defendant is interrogated in an accusatory investigation while in
the custody of police, he must be advised of his right to assistance
of counsel as well as of his right to remain silent. The majority
also justified the result on the basis of arrest without probable cause
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and the use of illegal evidence which-like the confession-was fruit
of the unlawful arrest. Two other judges concurred, but only because of what they considered improper procedure by the trial
court regarding the question of voluntariness of the confession.
They were of the opinion that the court was not called upon to
determine whether a suspect who has not requested counsel is
nevertheless entitled to advice by police regarding his right to
counsel and of his right to remain silent. State v. Dufour, 206
A.2d 82 (R.I. 1965).
The landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
firmly established that if an indigent defendant demands counsel
at trial time and is refused, his constitutional rights have been violated and he is entitled to a new trial. The decision stressed that
the right of counsel is a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial.
The right is applicable in a federal proceeding because of the sixth
amendment and is made obligatory in a state proceeding by
absorption through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Gideon, however, left unanswered the gaping question of
whether the right to counsel attaches only at trial time or at an
earlier phase in the proceedings.
The Supreme Court of the United States faced precisely this
issue in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Prior to his
confession, Danny Escobedo had conferred with counsel. When
the interrogation became intensified, he made repeated requests to
confer again with his counsel and his counsel did likewise. Their
only communication came when Escobedo saw his attorney motion
to him in the police station during the interrogation. The defendant, by his own admission, took this to impart renewed advice to
maintain silence. Escobedo subsequently confessed without being
permitted to talk with his attorney. Further, the officers failed
to warn him of his right to remain silent.
The Court, in a five-four decision, held that Escobedo's constitutional rights had been violated. The sixth amendment assures
the right to counsel from the beginning of the "prosecution," as
distinguished from the "trial." Mr. Justice Goldberg, speaking for
the majority, enunciated the rule that where an investigation has
begun to focus upon a particular suspect, whose request for counsel
has been denied and who has not received a warning as to his right
to remain silent, that suspect has been deprived of his rights under
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the sixth amendment. The Court thus expanded the constitutional
role of legal counsel beyond the tradition functions and duties
surrounding trial type proceedings. The ruling appears to make
the adversary atmosphere of the courtroom a necessary ingredient
of criminal investigation when the "focus is on the accused" with the
"purpose to elicit a confession." Danny Escobedo was entitled to
this adversary atmosphere as a matter of constitutional right. In
effect, this converts the decision to confess into a tactical decision
on the part of the defense. Enker and Elsen, Counsel for the
Suspect, 49 MN. L. IEv. 47,48 (1964). It is significant that Danny
Escobedo's confession was inadmissible because it would be fundamentally unfair to admit it and not because police tactics might
have rendered his admissions unreliable or untrustworthy.
The rationale of the principal case is based to a large extent on
the rule in Escobedo. There was, however, no request by Dufour
to confer with his attorney. Despite this difference, the Rhode
Island court held that the right to counsel was absolute and that
any rule necessitating a request for counsel is an "artificial requirement." The Rhode Island court cited a likewise liberal extension
of the Escobedo rule in People v. Dorado, 394 P.2d 952 (Calif.
1964). In Dorado, the court held that when police officers failed
to advise the accused of his right to remain silent or the right to
consult with counsel, his subsequent confession would be inadmissible even though he had not made a formal request for counsel.
In a re-hearing the California court stated in a four-three decision
that the "constitutional right [to counsel] does not arise from the
request for counsel but from the advent of the accusatory stage
itself."
A privilege lurking just below the surface in cases of this nature
merits mention. It must be remembered that an individual may
knowingly waive his privilege against self-incrimination and his
right to counsel either at the pretrial stage or at the trial. Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). However, the theory behind the
broad application of the Escobedo rule in the principal case is that
if the suspect is unaware of his rights and does not request counsel,
he should not be prejudiced by his ignorance. This interpretation
finds further footing in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962),
where Mr. Justice Brennan stated that "where the assistance of
counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished counsel does not depend on a request."
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A fact situation similar to those in Dorado and the principal case
recently came before the Supreme Court of Oregon. Although
skirting the issue of whether a request is a necessary requisite for
right to counsel, the court interpreted the rule in Escobedo to mean
that the state must affirmatively show a warning to the accused
of his constitutional right to remain silent. State v. Neely, 395
P.2d 557 (Ore. 1964). The suspect is thus protected from an abdication, through unawareness, of his constitutional rights. The
right protected by the Oregon court was the right to a warning
concerning self-incrimination (fifth amendment), rather than a
warning concerning effective representation by counsel at all stages
of the criminal proceeding (sixth amendment). With this in mind,
it is interesting to inspect the underlying basis for the Escobedo
decision. Since Danny Escobedo interpreted the motions of his
counsel as renewed advice to remain silent, it has been suggested
that it is doubtful whether the failure of police to so advise him
was central to the Court's decision. Enker and Elsen, supra at 60.
The Court's concern with protecting an accused from coercion by
police officers is obvious. In fact, the real vice in Escobedo seems
to be the persistent and secluded questioning of the suspect.
While the decisions discussed to this point have stressed that the
right to counsel accrues at some point before the actual trial, this
policy has not been universally approved. Consequently, a number
of state courts have refused to extend the rule in Escobedo as the
Rhode Island court did in the principal case. The main argument
against presence of counsel at this point in the proceedings is that
it impedes what has traditionally been considered proper police
questioning, as well as coercive tactics. It may very well result in
the suppression of truth rather than its disclosure. This is because
counsel, aware of the significance which an accused's admissions
may have in building the prosecution's case, would normally tell
his client to remain silent as a tactical decision. As a result, not
only will coerced confessions be eliminated, but so will voluntary
ones which will generally contain the truth. In essence, the accused's rights are increased, but at the expense of the search for
truth.
One of the first cases to be decided contra to Dufour and Dorado
and their liberal extensions of Escobedo was People v. Hartgraves,
202 N.E.2d 33 (Ill. 1964). The court stated that it did not "read
the Escobedo case as requiring" the rejection of a voluntary con-
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fession merely because the state did not caution the accused of
his right to have an attorney and his right to remain silent before
his admissions of guilt. Similarly, the Nevada court recently held
that where the accused did not request counsel, the fact that he
was not affirmatively warned of his attendant rights did not render
his confession inadmissible. Bean v. State, 398 P.2d 251 (Nev.
1965). This court also pointed out that Escobedo was not controlling since it was necessarily limited to the facts in that particular
case.
In Commonwealth v. Patrick, 206 A.2d 295 (Pa. 1965), a liberal
extension of Escobedo was discarded in favor of the traditional test
of voluntariness of the confession. The court stated that a "confession made during the interrogation by police, of voluntarily
made, may be constitutionally admissible" (italicized in original)
even though the accused was neither warned of his right to counsel
nor his right to remain silent. The Pennsylvania court thereby
applied a subjective test rather than an objective test, such as the
prophylactic rule enunciated in Dufour and Dorado.
The West Virginia court may soon have an opportunity to determine the thrust of Escobedo. In State v. Morris, petition for
writ of error and supersedeas filed, there is some question as to
whether the defendant actually requested to consult with an attorney. Counsel for the defendant argues in his petition that the
state, nevertheless, has an affirmative duty to advise the accused
of his right to counsel and of his right against self-incrimination.
However, counsel also relied on other grounds, including faulty
arrest, search not incident to arrest, and denial of an immediate
hearing.
Perhaps the full sweep of Escobedo will not be known until the
Supreme Court of the United States passes on a case involving the
"fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine. The "focus" and "purpose"
test promulgated in Escobedo would be greatly compounded if the
Court were to hold that not only the admissions obtained but all
leads developed from them were to be suppressed. Moreover, both
the animate and inanimate "fruits" of an otherwise voluntary confession may become ipso facto inadmissible if the Court adopts
the prophylactic rule in the principal case and holds that police
officers must affirmatively advise an accused of his right to counsel
and his right to remain silent.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1965

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 4 [1965], Art. 6

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

The Supreme Court's concern with the constitutional rights of
an accused in the back room of the police station is obviously
legitimate. Roscoe Pound recognized in 1934 the problem caused
by incommunicado grilling and suggested the solution achieved in
Escobedo regarding right to counsel. He also submitted that there
should be an express provision for a legal examination of suspected
of accused persons before a magistrate as well as a provision for
taking down evidence so as to guarantee accuracy. 24 J.CraM. L. &
C. 1014, 1017 (1934). If these safeguards are to be incorporated
in police investigatory methods, they apparently will get there
through judicial determination of constitutional rights of the accused. Whether Dufour is a proper extension of Escobedo and
whether the right to counsel becomes operative only upon request
are only two of many determinations which should be reached in
delineating the proper balance between the accuser and the
accused.
Lester Clay Hess, Jr.

Constitutional Law-Conscientious Objectors
Daniel Andrew Seeger, Arno Sascha Jakobson and Forrest Britt
Peter were convicted of refusing to submit to induction into the
armed forces as required by federal law. 50 U.S.C. § 456 (j)
(1958). This law exempts from military service persons who by
reason of religious training and belief are conscientiously opposed
to any participation in war. The act defines religious training and
belief as "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation,
but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal code."
The defendants expressed varied beliefs. Seeger stated that his
belief was a "belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for
their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed."
He did not, however, disavow a belief in relation to a Supreme
Being. Jakobson said that he believed in a "Supreme Being" who
was the "Creator of Man" in the sense of being "ultimately responsible for the existence of" and who was "the Supreme Reality" of
which "[Tihe existence of man is the result." Peter stated that the
source of his conviction was "our democratic American culture
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